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 Book Review: A Question of Balance: How France and the 
United States Created Cold War Europe by Michael Creswell 
by Nicholas Evan Sarantakes 
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
In studies of Cold War strategy, the dominant theme for several decades has been the influence 
of the Americans on the course of events. More internationally minded scholars have often looked 
at the role of the British during the early days of this non-conflict.  
Since 1990 a new trend in the literature has emerged. Those scholars with Eastern European 
language skills have gone into the archives of the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies 
and produced many interesting studies of varying importance. Accounts of the western alliance 
that focus on nations speaking languages other than English have been few and far between.  
As a result, Michael Creswell’s study of the French role in the emerging western alliance is 
important in and of itself. What makes this study even more important, though, is the provocative 
and revisionist argument that he advances. First, he shows the ties between World War II and the 
Cold War. Many French leaders were worried about a resurgent Germany. This concern was a 
legitimate one. France had been the battleground for three Franco-German wars in the 
proceeding 70 years.  
Other French leaders realized that for France to survive in this new post-war era, it needed the 
Germans along with the Americans and British. The result was an intense domestic political battle 
in Paris. The immediate issue was the European Defense Community, a supra-national army that 
would have French and German troops serving together. What control would France have over 
French units? How many and under what conditions would Germans serve in this new formation? 
The larger issue at stake in these debates was the future of the western alliance.  
The second factor that makes Creswell’s account significant is that he shows the influence of the 
second tier powers. The debate in France, which was understandably quite emotional given 
French experiences between 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, would determine much of how the 
western alliance developed. Creswell’s study shows that the Cold War was never a simple bi-
polar confrontation between Washington and Moscow; the British were never to the Americans 
what the Greeks were to the Romans. The middle-ranking powers on the continent—none more 
than France—had their say in the formation of Western Europe, a point Creswell makes with his 
subtitle.  
The French were not being difficult just to be difficult. The Eisenhower administration planned to 
reduce the presence of U.S. troops in Europe and wanted to use its nuclear arsenal for a 
defensive perimeter off European soil. France and Germany would provide conventional troops 
and by implication the battlefields for World War III. Needless to say, this idea did not strike 
French leaders as a particularly good one. They wanted a U.S. and British commitment to the 
continent and eventually agreed among themselves that the best way to use German resources 
was to give the new Federal Republic full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  
One of the major themes that emerges from this book is the importance of diplomacy in its 
classical definition. American and French leaders had honest policy disagreements, they talked to 
one another and came to agreements that served the interests of both nations. The United States 
was the stronger nation, but its power had limits. American officials were good at managing and 
leading the western alliance, which is different from expecting smaller powers to do whatever the 
big power decides to do.  
This study is international in its focus and Creswell has done the research to support his case. He 
has done extensive research in France, Belgium, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. In France, his research had a joint and interagency approach with examinations of 
material in the French National Archives as well as the specialized archives of the French Foreign 
Ministry, Army, Air Force and Navy. Although this book is about U.S.-French relations, his 
research in British archives is on par with what he did in France. The use of the NATO archives 
shows his comprehensive approach.  
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